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Abstract 
 
Retail loan markets create special challenges for credit risk assessment.  Borrowers tend to be 
informationally opaque and borrow relatively infrequently.  Retail loans are illiquid and do not 
trade in secondary markets.  For these reasons, historical credit databases are usually not available 
for retail loans.  Moreover, even when data are available, retail loan values are small in absolute 
terms and therefore application of sophisticated modeling is usually not cost effective on an 
individual loan-by-loan basis.  These features of retail lending have led to the development of 
techniques that rely on portfolio aggregation in order to measure retail credit risk exposure.  BIS 
proposals for the Basel New Capital Accord differentiate portfolios of mortgage loans from 
revolving credit loan portfolios from other retail loan portfolios in assessing the bank’s minimum 
capital requirement.  We survey the most recent BIS proposals for the credit risk measurement of 
retail credits in capital regulations.  We also describe the recent trend away from relationship 
lending toward transactional lending, even in the small business loan arena traditionally 
characterized by small banks extending relationship loans to small businesses.  These trends 
create the opportunity to adopt more analytical, data-based approaches to credit risk 
measurement.  We survey proprietary credit scoring models (such as Fair, Isaac and SMEloan), as 
well as options-theoretic structural models (such as KMV and Moody’s RiskCalc) and reduced 
form models (such as Credit Risk Plus). 
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Issues in the Credit Risk Modeling of Retail Markets 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Retail credit markets offer special challenges to practitioners, regulators and 
academics alike.  Because of the special features of the retail market, one cannot analyze 
small, retail loans by simply downsizing the models used to analyze large, wholesale 
loans.  The retail credit market provides funds to small, typically unrated borrowers.  The 
relatively small size of each loan implies that the absolute size of the credit risk on any 
individual loan is minimal.  Losses on any single retail loan will not cause a bank to 
become insolvent.  Thus, the cost per loan of determining the credit risk of retail loans is 
often greater than the benefit in terms of loss avoidance, and ascertaining the credit risk 
on an individual retail loan basis may not be worthwhile.  Moreover, the propensity to 
default or become delinquent may be affected by social factors, as well as standard 
economic and business cycle effects.  Gross and Souleles (2002) find that retail 
borrowers were increasingly willing to default on their credit card debt between 1995 and 
1997 due in large part to the falling social, information, and legal costs of default. 
The wholesale market, on the other hand, deals with large, negotiated loans to 
borrowers who often have credit ratings.  These large loans often are syndicated; thereby 
creating a secondary market which does not exist for retail bank loans.  Loan prices are 
available for syndicated loans trading in the secondary market.1  In contrast, retail loans 
are not frequently traded so there is no history of daily price fluctuations upon which to 
build future price or value expectations.  Risk characteristics such as the probability of 
                                                 
1 For example, Loan Pricing Corporation maintains a database that marks to market approximately 2,000 
syndicated bank loans on a daily basis using dealer bid/ask quotes. 
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default (PD), the loss given default (LGD) and default correlations differ from wholesale 
commercial loan markets so that the parameters used for wholesale loan markets cannot 
be used reliably for retail markets; see Risk Management Association (RMA) (2000).  
Although several models exist to guide the providers of wholesale loans,2 the body of 
research on retail credit risk measurement is quite sparse.  A survey of what we know, 
and perhaps more importantly, what we don’t know in the area of retail credit risk 
measurement is the topic of this paper. 
In this paper, we examine credit risk at the retail level.  In Section 2, we begin 
with an overview of the proposals from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
concerning international bank capital requirements for retail credit.  In Section 3, we 
examine some traditional models of credit risk measurement – expert systems, rating 
systems and credit scoring.  In Section 4, we compare two major approaches to small 
business lending - relationship lending, which entails significant private information 
produced by bank monitoring in the context of a long-standing bank-borrower business 
relationship, as compared to transactional lending, which does not incorporate a 
significant expenditure of resources by the bank on obtaining private information about 
the borrower.  Each of these forms of retail lending offer unique problems in the 
measurement of the retail loan’s credit risk.  For example, it may be more appropriate to 
measure the credit risk of the entire bank-borrower relationship, rather than concentrating 
on the stand-alone credit risk of an individual relationship bank loan.  In Section 5, we 
discuss how one may apply new techniques of credit risk measurement to retail loans, 
and the paper concludes in Section 6. 
 
                                                 
2 For more comprehensive coverage of the models, see Saunders and Allen (2002). 
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2.  BIS  Basel New Capital Accord 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS (2001), p. 55) defines retail credit as, 
“homogeneous portfolios comprising a large number of small, low value loans with either 
a consumer or business focus, and where the incremental risk of any single exposure is 
small.”  These types of loans include loans to individuals such as credit cards, residential 
mortgages and home equity loans as well as other personal loans such as educational or 
auto loans.  Small business loans could also be included as long as the bank treats these 
facilities the same way it treats other retail credits. 
The proposed Basel New Capital Accords allows banks to choose among several 
approaches to determine their capital requirements.  The Standardized Approach allows 
less sophisticated banks to use external credit ratings to classify the bank’s assets into risk 
classes.  Over time, banks are expected to evolve to the Internal Ratings-Based 
Approaches (Foundation and Advanced) that rely on the bank’s own experience in 
determining the risk characteristics of various asset classes.  For example, the Foundation 
IRB Approach for corporate, sovereign, and bank exposures allows banks to provide 
estimates of probability of default, but requires banks to use supervisory estimates of loss 
given default, exposure at default, and maturity.  The Advanced IRB Approach for such 
exposures allows banks to provide estimates of PD, LGD, and EAD, and requires banks 
to provide estimates of maturity. 
The treatment of small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) exposures is viewed 
as especially important in countries where small/medium sized firms comprise a 
significant component of the industrial sector (e.g. Germany).  SME borrowers are 
defined by the Basel Committee as those with less than €50 million in annual sales.  Such 
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exposures are allowed to have up to 20% lower capital requirements than exposures to 
larger firms.  Furthermore, banks that treat their SME exposures as a homogenous 
portfolio (in the same way as they treat their retail exposures) are permitted to apply the 
retail IRB capital requirements to the portfolio as long as the exposure to the bank of any 
individual SME is less than €1 million. 
Banks opting to use the Standardized Approach for their retail exposures would 
continue to use the 8% capital requirement (under the original Basel Capital Accord, 
which was implemented in 1992) to calculate the minimum capital requirement.   
However, the risk weights would vary for different classes of retail loans.  Specifically: 
K = EAD x RW x 0.08,       (1) 
where K = capital requirement,  
EAD = exposure at default of the retail assets, and  
RW = risk weight, which is set equal to 40% for residential mortgages and 75% 
for other retail credit.   
If banks choose the IRB Approach for retail credit exposures, the banks must 
estimate PD and LGD, as well as EAD.  No explicit maturity factor is included in the 
functions since the correlation assumptions for the various types of retail exposures 
(shown below) reflect the average maturity of the retail exposures.  Moreover, no 
distinction exists between the Foundation and Advanced IRB approach for retail credit. 
On July 10, 2002, the BIS Basel Committee reached agreement on proposals for 
several internal ratings-based models for retail credit risk measurement.  For the three  
types of retail credit (residential mortgages, revolving credit and other retail loans), these 
models specify the risk-weighted assets, as well as the amount of capital banks must hold 
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for each portfolio comprised of retail credit exposures.  The Technical Guidance manual 
(BIS (2002)) details each model.  For all retail exposures, banks provide assessments of 
the probability of default (PD) as well as loss given default (LGD). 
As shown in Figure 1 (for LGD set equal to 45%), the highest risk weights among 
all retail credits are assigned to residential mortgages.  The July 2002 BIS proposal 
stipulates that the capital requirement for residential mortgages is to be calculated as 
follows: 
K = LGD x N )]999.0(1/()(1/1[ xGRRPDxGR −+−    (2) 
Where  N = the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random 
variable, G = inverse cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random 
variable, and R = correlation.  For residential mortgages, the correlation is set at 0.15.   
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
The capital requirements for other retail credits are similar to those shown in 
equation (2), with a proposed correlation function for other retail credits that differs from 
the flat 0.15 correlation assumption applied to residential mortgages.  Thus, the BIS July 
2002 proposals for minimum capital levels required against other retail credits are: 
K = LGD x N )]999.0(1/()(1/1[ xGRRPDxGR −+−    
Where  N = the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random 
variable, G = inverse cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random 
variable, and R = correlation.  The proposed correlation expression is: 
R = 0.02 x )]1/()1(1[17.0)1/()1( 35353535 −−−− −−−+−− eexee xPDxPD        (3) 
The impact of the correlation expression in equation (3) is to decrease the correlation 
coefficient at higher levels of PD.  Table 1 shows that the risk weight for other retail 
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credits is slightly above the risk weight for residential mortgages at low levels of PD 
(below 0.50%), but decreases (relative to the risk weight for residential mortgages) at 
higher levels of PD, as a result of the assumed inverse relationship between correlation 
and PD in equation (3).3  Thus, as PD exceeds 0.50%, the correlation on other retail 
credits calculated using equation (3) falls below 0.15, thereby lowering the risk weight 
and the bank’s capital requirement for other retail credit as compared to residential 
mortgages.4  
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
The third model is proposed for the measurement of bank capital requirements for 
revolving credit.  As shown in Figure 1, revolving credit has the lowest capital 
requirement of all three retail credits under the proposed July 2002 IRB.  The lower 
capital requirements for revolving credit reflects a belief that although retail products 
have higher rates of estimated default and higher loss given default (LGD), the 
correlation among retail products is lower than among wholesale products.  (See RMA 
(2000).)  This assumption is reflected in the proposed regulations in two ways.  First, the 
correlation expression for revolving credits is lower (at each level of PD) than the 
correlation for other retail credits (and lower than the correlation for residential 
mortgages at most levels of PD).  Second, the capital requirement is lowered for 
revolving exposures to allow 90% of expected losses to be covered by future income.   
                                                 
3 The assumption of an inverse relationship between PD and correlation is quite controversial.  Most 
academic studies find a direct relationship such that higher quality, low PD firms tend to have less 
systematic risk and therefore lower correlations, whereas lower quality, high PD firms are more subject to 
market shocks and therefore have higher correlations.  See Allen and Saunders (2002) for a discussion. 
4 That is, the risk weight and capital requirements for both residential mortgages and other retail credits 
increase as PD increases (holding LGD constant), but the risk weight for residential mortgages increases by 
more than the risk weight for other retail credits at higher PD levels. 
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Thus, the July 2002 IRB proposals for minimum capital requirements for revolving credit 
are: 
K = LGD x N )]999.0(1/()(1/1[ xGRRPDxGR −+−  - (0.90PD x LGD)   (4) 
For revolving exposures, the correlation is: 
R = 0.02 x )]1/()1(1[15.0)1/()1( 50505050 −−−− −−−+−− eexee xPDxPD               (5) 
The last term in equation (4) reduces the capital requirement on revolving credits 
by 90% of expected losses (PD x LGD).  Comparing equation (5) to (3) shows the lower 
correlation (at each level of PD) for revolving credits as compared to other retail credits. 
Carey (2001) sees several challenges to small business lenders posed by the Basel 
proposals.  Banks using credit scoring must convert their scores into variables stipulated 
in the Basel formula.  The results of most credit scoring models are binary: the borrower 
is either a “good” risk or a “bad” risk.  Banks must find a method to convert these scores 
into probabilities of default (i.e. PD’s).  The conversion could be problematic in that the 
score could have different meanings in different economic settings.  That is, the same 
score could represent vastly different probabilities of default depending on the state of the 
economy.  Data pose another challenge.  The Accord requires banks to record how well 
their models prepared them for losses.  That is, the banks must keep a record of projected 
losses and compare the projections with actual losses over time.  This requirement forces 
banks to implement new tracking systems since, according to RMA (2000), many banks 
have information on retail loans for the most recent 48 months at most.  Moreover, even 
less sophisticated banks will be required to perform complicated, data-intensive back-
testing of their models.   
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Another problem could be the different assessments banks assign to the same type 
of product.  Since individual loan risk assessment is not economically feasible, banks 
group their retail loans into portfolios along product lines.  RMA (2000) gathered 
information from 11 U.S. and Canadian banks on how they measure credit risk for retail 
products and identified eight distinct retail product lines: first mortgages, credit cards, 
leasing, student loans, other secured retail loans, other unsecured retail loans, home 
equity loans and home equity lines of credit.  If a bank assesses a higher probability of 
default or loss given default for a particular product line, then that bank must hold more 
capital than a bank that assigns a lower probability.  The RMA study examined how 
banks assign two important characteristics of risk: expected default frequency and loss 
given default along retail product lines.  Overall, loss given default tends to be higher for 
retail products (except first mortgages) than for wholesale loans, but correlations among 
retail loans tends to be lower.  Banks assigned similar risk characteristics for six of the 
products – first mortgages, credit cards, leasing, student loans, other secured, and other 
unsecured loans.  Banks differed mainly on their assessments of two other products, 
namely home equity loans and home equity lines of credit.  In assigning these risk 
characteristics, banks often make use of the traditional models of credit risk measurement 
that will be surveyed in the next section. 
 
3.  Traditional Approaches to Credit Risk Measurement 
Traditional methods focus on estimating the probability of default (PD) and 
typically specify “default” to include bankruptcy filing, default, or liquidation.  We 
consider three broad categories of traditional models used to estimate PD: (1) expert 
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systems, including artificial neural networks; (2) rating systems; and (3) credit scoring 
models. 
3.1 Expert Systems 
Historically, bankers have relied on loan officer expert systems such as the 5 C’s 
of credit to assess credit quality: character (reputation), capital (leverage), capacity 
(earnings volatility), collateral, and cycle (macroeconomic) conditions.  Evaluation of the 
5 C’s is performed by human experts, who may be inconsistent and subjective in their 
assessments.  Moreover, traditional expert systems specify no weighting scheme that 
would consistently order the 5 C’s in terms of their relative importance in forecasting PD.  
Thus, artificial neural networks have been introduced to develop more objective expert 
systems.  A neural network is “trained” using historical repayment experience and default 
data.  Structural matches are found that coincide with defaulting firms and then used to 
determine a weighting scheme to forecast PD.  Each time that the neural network 
evaluates the credit risk of a new loan opportunity, it updates its weighting scheme so that 
it continually “learns” from experience.  Thus, neural networks are flexible, adaptable 
systems that can incorporate changing conditions into the decision making process.   
 Empirical tests of the accuracy of neural networks produce mixed results.  Kim 
and Scott (1991) use a supervised artificial neural network to predict bankruptcy in a 
sample of 190 Compustat firms.  While the system performs well (87% prediction rate) 
during the year of bankruptcy, its accuracy declines markedly over time, showing only a 
75%, 59%, and 47% prediction accuracy one-year prior, two-years prior, and three-years 
prior to bankruptcy, respectively.  Altman et al. (1994) examine 1,000 Italian industrial 
firms from 1982-1992 and find that neural networks have about the same level of 
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accuracy as do credit scoring models.  Podding (1994), using data on 300 French firms 
collected over three years, claims that neural networks outperform credit scoring models 
in bankruptcy prediction.  However, he finds that not all artificial neural systems are 
equal, noting that the multi-layer perception (or back propagation) network is best suited 
for bankruptcy prediction.  Yang et al. (1999) uses a sample of oil and gas company debt 
to show that the back propagation neural network obtained the highest classification 
accuracy overall, when compared to the probabilistic neural network, and discriminant 
analysis.  However, discriminant analysis outperforms all models of neural networks in 
minimizing type 2 classification errors, that is, misclassifying a good loan as bad. 
During “training” the neural network fits a system of weights to each financial 
variable included in a database consisting of historical repayment/default experiences.  
However, the network may be “overfit” to a particular database if excessive training has 
taken place, thereby resulting in poor out-of-sample estimates.  Moreover, neural 
networks are costly to implement and maintain.  Because of the large number of possible 
connections, the neural network can grow prohibitively large rather quickly.  Finally, 
neural networks suffer from a lack of transparency.  Since there is no clear economic 
interpretation that can be attached to the hidden intermediate steps, the system cannot be 
checked for plausibility and accuracy.  Structural errors will not be detected until PD 
estimates become noticeably inaccurate.  
 3.2   Internal Rating Systems 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in the United States has 
long required banks to use internal ratings systems to rank the credit quality of loans in 
their portfolios.  However, the rating system has been rather crude, with most loans rated 
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as Pass/Performing and only a minority of loans differentiated according to the four non-
performing classifications (listed in order of declining credit quality): other assets 
especially mentioned, substandard, doubtful, and loss.  Similarly, the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners requires insurance companies to rank their 
assets using a rating schedule with six classifications corresponding to the following 
credit ratings: A and above, BBB, BB, B, below B, and default.  
Many banks have instituted internal ratings systems in preparation for the BIS 
New Capital Accords scheduled for implementation in 2006.  The architecture of the 
internal rating system can be one-dimensional, in which an overall rating is assigned to 
each loan based on the probability of default (PD), or two-dimensional, in which each 
borrower’s PD is assessed separately from the loss severity of the individual loan.  
Treacy and Carey (2000) estimate that 60 percent of the financial institutions in their 
survey had one-dimensional rating systems, although they recommend a two-dimensional 
system.  Moreover, the BIS (2000) found that banks were better able to assess their 
borrowers’ PD than their loss given default.5   
Treacy and Carey (2000) in their survey of the 50 largest US bank holding 
companies, and the BIS (2000) in their survey of 30 financial institutions across the G-10 
countries found considerable diversity in internal ratings models.  Although all used 
similar financial risk factors, there were differences across financial institutions with 
regard to the relative importance of each of the factors.  Treacy and Carey (2000) found 
that qualitative factors played more of a role in determining the ratings of loans to small 
and medium-sized firms, with the loan officer chiefly responsible for the ratings, in 
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contrast with loans to large firms in which the credit staff primarily set the ratings using 
quantitative methods such as credit-scoring models.  Typically, ratings were set with a 
one year time horizon, although loan repayment behavior data were often available for 3-
5 years.6 
3.3 Credit Scoring Models 
 The most commonly used traditional credit risk measurement 
methodology is the multiple discriminant credit scoring analysis pioneered by Altman 
(1968).  Mester (1997) documents the widespread use of credit scoring models: 97 
percent of banks use credit scoring to approve credit card applications, whereas 70 
percent of the banks use credit scoring in their small business lending.  There are four 
methodological forms of multivariate credit scoring models: (1) the linear probability 
model, (2) the logit model, (3) the probit model, and (4) the multiple discriminant 
analysis model.  All of these models identify financial variables that have statistical 
explanatory power in differentiating defaulting firms from non-defaulting firms.  Once 
the model’s parameters are obtained, loan applicants are assigned a Z-score assessing 
their classification as good or bad.  The Z-score itself can be converted into a PD. 
Credit scoring models are relatively inexpensive to implement and do not suffer 
from the subjectivity and inconsistency of expert systems.  Table 2 shows the spread of 
these models throughout the world, as surveyed by Altman and Narayanan (1997).  What 
is striking is not so much the models’ differences across countries of diverse sizes and in 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 In order to adopt the Internal-Ratings Based Advanced Approach in the new Basel Capital Accord, banks 
must adopt a risk rating system that assesses the borrower’s credit risk exposure (LGD) separately from 
that of the transaction. 
6 A short time horizon may be appropriate in a mark to market model, in which downgrades of credit 
quality are considered, whereas a longer time horizon may be necessary for a default mode that considers 
only the default event.  See Hirtle et al. (2001). 
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various stages of development, but rather their similarities.  Most studies found that 
financial ratios measuring profitability, leverage, and liquidity had the most statistical 
power in differentiating defaulted from non-defaulted firms.   
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
One of the most widely used credit scoring systems was developed by Fair, Isaac 
and Co. Inc. (FICO).  During the 1960’s and 1970’s, the firm created credit scoring 
systems tailored to meet the needs of individual clients, mainly retail stores and banks in 
the United States.  In the 1980’s, Fair, Isaac serviced more industries including insurance, 
as well as more countries in Europe.  During the 1990’s, the firm developed products to 
evaluate credit of small businesses including trade credit (CreditFYI.com) in 1998 and 
loan credit (LoanWise.com) in 1999.  Personal credit evaluation became more accessible 
with the development of myfico.com in 2001.  Customers can determine their credit score 
directly using the internet. 
Credit scoring systems vary according to the information they evaluate and how 
they evaluate it.  For example, Fair, Isaac assesses credit reports and credit history to 
determine a score that ranges between 300 and 850.  The assessment considers all 
outstanding debt such as mortgage loans and credit card balances as well as the 
proportion of balances to credit limits on credit cards.  Payment history, such as whether 
and how often an individual was late in making payments as well as the length of the 
credit history is also included.    The evaluation does not include characteristics that could 
bias a lender such as race, religion, national origin, gender, or marital status.  However, 
the evaluation also ignores salary and occupation so that a person with a good, steady 
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income and a history of always paying his/her credit card receivables may not achieve a 
perfect score.   
Some shortcomings of credit scoring models are data limitations and the 
assumption of linearity.  Using analysis of variance, discriminant analysis fits a linear 
function of explanatory variables to the historical data on default and repayment.  
Moreover, as shown in Table 2, the explanatory variables are predominately limited to 
balance sheet data.  These data are updated infrequently and are determined by 
accounting procedures that rely on book, rather than market valuation.  Finally, there is 
often limited economic theory as to why a particular financial ratio would be useful in 
forecasting default.   
Recent modifications of credit scoring have given banks the opportunity to treat 
small business loans as retail credit.  That is, before the application of credit scoring to 
small business loans, such loans were usually made on a relationship basis.  The 
following section explains the differences and implications of relationship versus 
transactional lending. 
  
4. Pricing of Small Business Loans 
Loans to small businesses differ from loans to large businesses.  Peterson (1999) 
suggests three major differences.  First, since lenders face fixed costs in lending, lending 
to small firms is by definition more expensive per dollar lent.  Second, the relationship 
between the owner/manager of a small firm and a small bank is often very close.  Finally, 
small firms are more informationally opaque.  Because of these structural features, banks 
can choose how they treat their retail credits for risk analysis purposes.  Some (usually 
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small) banks attempt to treat their small business customers the same way that they treat 
their large commercial borrowers.  Balance sheet and income statement data are collected 
and analyzed.  When such data are not available, as is often the case in small businesses, 
modifications are made.  Analysis consisted of bypassing the need for “hard” data by 
building a relationship with the owner/manager and therefore obtaining the necessary 
information to assess the credit-worthiness of the client.  Such relationship lending differs 
markedly from the current trend toward transactional lending. 
In contrast to relationship small business loans, transactional loans are pooled 
together and treated as if they are a homogenous portfolio.  Thus, rather than ascertaining 
the risk characteristics of a particular borrower, the bank analyzes the overall PD and 
LGD of the entire portfolio of transactional retail loans.  This approach to small business 
lending is used most often by large banks, whereas smaller banks typically specialize in 
relationship lending to small businesses; see Berger and Udell (1995) and Petersen and 
Rajan (1994).   
4.1 Relationship Lending 
Banks that engage in relationship lending often obtain information about their 
clients that is proprietary.  Banks form a special bond with their clients either by serving 
them over time or providing many products simultaneously (see Boot (2000)).  Peterson 
(1999) suggests that relationship lending is similar to taking an equity stake in a firm.  
Berlin and Mester (1998) show how relationship lending can lead to loan rate smoothing 
over time.  Relationship lending is based on “soft” data such as personal connections and 
reputation.   
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4.1.1 Pricing Relationship Loans 
Most research on the pricing of small business loans looks at the length and 
breadth of the relationship between the bank and its client.  The research then determines 
how that relationship affects the price of the loan.  Studies by Peterson and Rajan (1994) 
and Berger and Udell (1995) show that relationship banking results in new borrowers 
subsidizing established borrowers.  That is, banks charge clients with whom they have 
had long-term relationships lower interest rates than new clients.   
The competitive structure of the banking industry influences these findings.  
Rajan and Petersen (1995) theorize that banks in competitive markets need to make a 
profit from clients as soon as possible since the clients may seek other providers.  Inderst 
and Mueller (2002) extend the Rajan-Peterson results with a model that shows that in the 
presence of credit risk, the lender must obtain the full surplus from the project or else the 
lender will be too conservative in its lending policy and not finance projects with positive 
net present values.  Bergstresser (2001) tests the Rajan-Peterson theory and shows that 
concentrated markets have fewer constrained borrowers, because concentrated markets 
are able to extract more rents from borrowers, thereby allowing banks in concentrated 
markets “to take more chances.”  As the relationship between the client and the bank 
matures, the bank charges a lower interest rate on the loans it extends to that client.  
However, the drop in interest rates is more pronounced in competitive markets than in 
concentrated markets.  These results are consistent with the Rajan-Petersen model.  
4.1.2 Drawbacks of Relationship Lending 
Relationships are expensive to establish and maintain.  Time and resources must 
be readily available for the recipients of relationship loans.  While small banks have a 
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competitive advantage in making relationship loans (see Berger and Udell (1996)), the 
banks themselves may remain small since they cannot generate enough business to 
become large.  Relationships are particularly expensive for large banks since large banks 
have sufficient capital to make large loans.  Spending time to cultivate small accounts is 
simply not an efficient use of resources when the same amount of effort can result is a 
much larger loan. 
Moreover, the special relationship between the bank and client may not maximize 
profits for the bank.  Berlin and Mester (1998) show that loan rate smoothing in light of 
interest rate shocks can be profitable for banks that engage in relationship lending, but 
such smoothing as a result of credit risk shocks can be detrimental to the profitability of 
lending institutions.  
Relationship lending could also lead to discrimination.  Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) 
examine credit granted to small businesses based on the gender, race, and ethnicity of the 
owner.  Even after controlling for personal and business credit histories, the authors find 
denial rates for black men are substantially higher than for white men.  Also, women tend 
to receive fewer loans in concentrated markets.  However, competition within a local 
banking area appears to lower discrimination.   
Despite the costs, large banks have recently taken an interest in small business 
lending.  This interest stems in part from the pressure of disintermediation that caused 
large banks to lose business as many of their more lucrative clients go directly to the 
capital markets.  Moreover, the interest could reflect a desire to obtain higher, more 
consistent profits.  Bassett and Brady (2001) report that between 1985 and 2000, the net 
interest margins of banks was consistently about 1 percent higher for small banks than for 
 18 
large banks, suggesting that small banks are able to extract more profit from the loans 
they make.  During the same time period, small banks experienced a gradual increase in 
return on assets (ROA) from approximately 0.7 percent to 1.1 percent.  The ROA for 
large banks vacillated from a low of -0.4% in 1987 to 1.1 percent in 2000.  Large banks 
therefore have an incentive to capture part of the lucrative retail loan market.  If large 
banks learn to make retail loans efficiently, they might smooth their earnings and perhaps 
increase their net interest margins and therefore revenues and profits.  This interest in 
retail credit by large banks has spurred new ways of making loans to small businesses, 
namely transactional lending. 
4.2 Transactional Lending 
In contrast to relationship lending, transactional lending is based on portfolio risk 
measurement tools, such as credit scoring (described in Section 3.3).  Banks review loan 
applications based on specific, quantifiable criteria.  One widely used model is by Fair, 
Isaac, and another model is by SMEloan.  Although credit scoring results may be quite 
inaccurate for informationally-opaque small business borrowers, banks anticipate a 
portfolio diversification effect based on the average performance of the entire 
transactional loan portfolio. 
Using its credit scoring model for individual consumers, Fair, Isaac and Co. Inc. 
developed its Small Business Scoring System (SBSS) in the early 1990s.  The impetus 
for the SBSS came from Robert Morris Associates (RMA), renamed Risk Management 
Association, a group representing credit risk managers from over 3,000 financial 
institutions.  The practitioners from RMA noticed that repayment of small business loans 
depended less on the business itself than on the credit history of the founder.  That is, an 
 19 
individual who repays debts is likely to run a small business that repays its debts.  RMA 
asked Fair, Isaac to develop a model based on their observations.  Fair, Isaac studied the 
data collected by 17 banks on 5,000 small business loans.  Fair, Isaac analyzed hundreds 
of pieces of data collected on each loan and determined that fewer than a dozen aspects of 
the borrower were important.  These aspects included total assets of the firm as well as 
the time in business.  Fair, Isaac also verified the observations of the practitioners, 
namely the characteristics of the owner – e.g. age, number of dependents, and time at 
address – were more important than the business itself.  In 2002, over 350 U.S. lenders 
used the system in the analysis of over one million credit decisions. 
SMEloan focuses not on the owner of a small business, but rather on 
fundamentals of the individual business.  Established in 1999 in Hong Kong, SMEloan is 
based on the premise that financial statements of a small business do not reveal the true 
state of the firm’s potential and that collateral is usually not worth much in the case of 
default.  SMEloan patterns its small business loan model on a credit card model that 
looks at a few, simple pieces of data.  In the case of small businesses, SMEloan collects 
data on sales, cash flow, and accounts receivable.  As with credit cards, the lender 
monitors loans in the context of a portfolio and focuses only on small businesses that 
experience problems.    
Banks that use credit scoring models appear to be more productive at lower costs.  
Longenecker et al. (1997) report the results of Hibernia Corporation, which implemented 
credit scoring in 1993.  Loan officers went from processing 100 applications per month in 
1993 to 1,100 in 1995.  The business loan portfolio increased from $100 million to $600 
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million during the same time period.  Moreover, the bank appeared to make fewer bad 
loans.  
Feldman (1997) details the advantages of credit scoring.  No face to face contact 
is necessary so the bank can be located anywhere and still make the loan.  Documentation 
is minimal since only the credit history of the owner/borrower is reviewed.  Review is 
therefore much faster and probably results in lower costs.  Loan losses could also be 
reduced as the portfolio diversification effect results in fewer bad loans on average.  
Lending volume can also increase substantially.  
One implication of credit scoring is that banks can lend to clients located farther 
and farther away.  Petersen and Rajan (2001) show that this long-distance lending stems 
from greater bank productivity.  Banks not only have more information, but they are able 
to use the information they have more productively.  Petersen and Rajan (2001) find that 
banks are providing small business loans to clients who are located in ever more 
geographically dispersed  regions.  This has the advantage of shielding the bank’s 
portfolio from the effects of imperfect geographic diversification.  Petersen and Rajan 
(2001) also show that banks are able to provide such geographically diversified loans, 
because hard data concerning the clients are now available.  Moreover, bank productivity 
has increased.   
Credit scoring also affords benefits to borrowers.  Not only is credit more 
available, but competition is also stronger since more banks can cover wider areas of 
business.  One implication is that borrowers are no longer at the mercy of their local 
banks.  Singletary (1995) reports that, “Now, small-business owners don’t have to grovel 
at the loan officer’s desk.” 
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One reason transaction loans are possible in the United States is that credit 
information is readily available.  Staten (2001) points out that the United States is 
unusual is promoting the dissemination of credit reports.  Such information allows 
lenders to assess the credit-worthiness of borrowers and therefore provides more credit in 
the economy.  Not only is credit information available, but it is more complete in that 
credit reports show both positive and negative history.  Some countries report only 
negative credit information on clients.  Banks in “negative-only” reporting countries such 
as in Australia extend fewer loans.  In a simulation, Staten (2001) reports that at a 
targeted default rate of 4%, the negative-only model extended loans to 11% fewer 
applicants than the full model.  For every 100,000 applicants, the negative-only model 
extended 11,000 fewer loans.  Since credit has a multiplier effect, the restriction of credit 
can lower the growth of an economy. 
4.2.1 Pricing Transactional Loans 
Pricing relationship loans is vastly different from pricing transactional loans.  
Transactional lending to small businesses is based on hard data, such as the credit history 
of the borrowers (e.g. Fair, Isaac model) or accounts receivable (e.g. SMEloan).  Thus, 
 lending rates can reflect credit scores for transactional loans.  For example, 
www.myFICO.com (2003) details the different national average home lending rates for 
different levels of FICO scores.  People with higher credit scores pay lower interest rates.  
In another example, Feldman (1997) reports that Wells Fargo charges small businesses a 
range of interest rates from prime plus one percent to prime plus eight percent based on 
the business’ credit score.  Such gradations may not be possible if based on human 
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judgment (i.e. expert models) because of concerns about objectivity and consistency 
across borrowers.   
There appears to be a systematic difference in the way banks treat relationship 
loans as compared to transactional loans.  Cole et al. (1999) document that large banks 
use credit scoring for small business loans while small banks tend to make loans based on 
relationships.  Using probit analysis, the authors analyze the influence of loan, 
relationship, and firm financial characteristics on the probability of a bank extending a 
loan.  They find that large banks tend to “go by the numbers” and characteristics such as 
high debt-to-assets and low cash-to-assets reduce the probability of a large bank 
extending a loan.  Relationship characteristics are more important for the decisions of 
small banks with the deposit relationship increasing the likelihood of the small bank 
extending a loan and the loans outstanding relationship decreasing the likelihood.  
Interestingly, a borrower with past delinquencies has a lower likelihood of obtaining a 
loan from a small bank than a larger one.  As Peterson (1999) points out, the result is 
surprising since relationships should allow for a more troubled past.  Another interesting 
result is that African American borrowers tend to have more difficulty obtaining loans 
from large banks than small banks.  Cole et al. (1999) posit that minority status could be 
a proxy for the owner’s (lack of a) credit history. 
4.2.2 Drawbacks of Transactional Lending 
Despite the advantages of credit scoring for small business loans, Mester (1997) 
reports that only 8% of banks with up to $5 billion in assets used scoring for small 
business loans.  Perhaps small banks are reluctant to switch to the use of quantitative 
models, fearing their customers will miss the personal service of relationship lending.  
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However,  Burger et al. (1997) point out that customers left the warmth of “mom and 
pop” shops in droves when they realized the savings and convenience they could have by 
shopping at Wal-Mart.   
Small banks apparently believe that they have advantages in making small 
business loans.  Indeed, Berger et al. (2001a) show that large and foreign-owned banks 
tend to lend to large, urban clients suggesting small banks have a competitive advantage 
in lending to small firms.  However, the study is based on data are from Argentina.  In 
other countries such as the United States, the availability of credit scoring models and the 
information needed to run the models may suggest that we cannot generalize from the 
results of this study. 
The special relationship between banks and their clients is lessened or lost when 
lending becomes a transactional exercise.  Banks are perceived as having superior 
information concerning the clients to whom they lend.  Dahiya et al. (2001) show that the 
market reacts negatively when a bank sells a loan in its portfolio.  The perception is well-
founded: firms whose loans are sold have a higher probability of bankruptcy than firms 
that do not.  This special relationship is lost as soon as the loans are treated as 
transactional retail exposures. 
To address some of these concerns, the Risk Management Association advertises: 
“Is personal service key to your success?  Is relationship banking more important to you 
than transaction-based business?... [If so], have we got a tool for you!  The RMA/Fair, 
Isaac Small Business Scoring Service (SBSS) will dramatically increase the power and 
effectiveness of your bank’s customer-focus, relationship-oriented strategy.  When you 
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use SBSS to score your small business loans, you enhance your ability to manage credit 
risks and maximize the potential of the small business market.” 
Transactional lending’s apparent lack of personal touch could also be overcome.  
Pine et al. (1995) point out the use of hard data could lead to “mass customization.”  Such 
customization, however, relies on managing customer needs as opposed to managing 
products.  Products could be priced individually just as Dell computers are individually 
created to suit individual needs, but are still able to turn the company a profit.  
Furthermore, relationship databases could be established.  This would combine the 
informational benefits of relationship lending, with the cost efficiencies of transactional 
lending. 
4.2.3 Consolidation and Transactional Lending 
The trend toward consolidation within the financial services industry could lead to 
fewer, more expensive loans to small businesses.  Since small banks tend to put more of 
their assets toward small loans and have a comparative advantage in relationship lending, 
large banks would reduce overall credit availability for small businesses.  Loans to small 
businesses would then fall in areas where consolidation is higher.However, empirical 
analysis does not support this hypothesis.  Although large banks tend to treat small 
business loans as retail credit, Black and Strahan (2002) show that credit to small 
businesses actually increases in areas where markets where consolidation is more 
prevalent.  The authors suggest that the result stems from the observation that large banks 
are better at risk diversification than small banks.  Treating small business loans as 
transactional retail credit, therefore, may actually help small business entrepreneurs.  
Moreover, competitive markets seem to supply entrepreneurs with more credit than less 
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competitive markets. Berger et al. (2001b) find interest rates to small businesses lower in 
markets dominated by large banks.  Berger et al. (1998) find that other financial 
institutions pick up any small business loans that may be lost during the consolidation 
process.  Scott and Dunkelberg (1999) also find little impact of bank mergers on credit 
availability or cost. 
Kahn et al. (2001) show that bank consolidation affects different types of retail 
loans differently.  Interest rates on unsecured personal loans that are usually 
heterogeneous tend to increase after mergers, whereas  rates on auto loans tend to fall.  
The authors explain their findings with the observation that strong competition exists for 
car loans.  Banks can take advantage of scale economies in providing car loans.  They 
further substantiate their suggestion by noting that when one bank lowers its rates on car 
loans, other banks follow suit.   
As the retail loan market moves toward more analytical, data-based transactional 
lending, there is increased opportunity to adapt modern models of credit risk 
measurement for the retail market.   In the next section, we briefly survey the two major 
strands of the literature – structural models and reduced form models of credit risk 
measurement. 
 
5. Structural Models of Credit Risk Measurement  
Modern methods of credit risk measurement can be traced to two alternative 
branches in the asset pricing literature of academic finance: an options-theoretic 
structural approach pioneered by Merton (1974) and a reduced form approach, which 
uses intensity-based models to estimate stochastic hazard rates, following a literature 
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pioneered by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Jarrow et al. (1997), Duffie and Singleton 
(1998), and Duffie and Singleton (1999).  These two schools of thought offer differing 
methodologies to accomplish the central task of all credit risk measurement models – 
estimation of default probabilities.  The structural approach models the economic process 
of default, whereas reduced form models decompose risky debt prices in order to estimate 
the random intensity process underlying default.  The two approaches can be reconciled if 
asset values follow a random intensity-based process, with shocks that may not be fully 
observed because of imperfect accounting disclosures.  See Duffie and Lando (2001), 
Zhou (1997), and Zhou (2001).  No formal model for retail credit has yet used the 
reduced form approach, although one model, Credit Risk Plus, could be used for retail 
credit.   
We first discuss the options-theoretic structural approach, which is used by 
KMV’s Portfolio Manager and Moody’s RiskCalc to determine default probabilities.  The 
KMV model includes an adaptation for retail credit.  We then discuss the possibilities of 
using the reduced form approach, which forms the basis for Credit Risk Plus.  
Merton (1974) models equity in a levered firm as a call option on the firm’s assets 
with a strike price equal to the debt repayment amount (denoted B in Figure 2).  If at 
expiration (coinciding to the maturity of the firm’s short-term liabilities (usually one 
year), assumed to be comprised of pure discount debt instruments) the market value of 
the firm’s assets (denoted A in Figure 2) exceeds the value of its debt, then the firm’s 
shareholders will exercise the option to “repurchase” the company’s assets by repaying 
the debt.  However, if the market value of the firm’s assets falls below the value of its 
debt (A<B), then the option will expire unexercised and the firm’s shareholders will 
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default.7  The PD until expiration is set equal to the maturity date of the firm’s pure 
discount debt, typically assumed to be one year, though Delianedis and Geske (1998) 
consider a more complex structure of liabilities.  Thus, the PD until expiration is equal to 
the likelihood that the option will expire out of the money.  To determine the PD, the call 
option8 can be valued using an iterative method to estimate the unobserved variables that 
determine the value of the equity call option; in particular, A (the market value of assets) 
and σA (the volatility of assets).  These values for A and σA are then combined with the 
amount of debt liabilities B that have to be repaid at a given credit horizon in order to 
calculate the firm’s Distance to Default (defined to be 
A
BA
σ
−  or the number of standard 
deviations between current asset values and the debt repayment amount).  The higher the 
Distance to Default (denoted DD), the lower the PD.  To convert the DD into a PD 
estimate, Merton (1974) assumes that asset values are log normally distributed.  Since 
this distributional assumption is often violated in practice, proprietary structural models 
use alternative approaches to map the DD into a PD estimate.  For example, KMV’s 
Portfolio Manager and Moody’s RiskCalc estimates an empirical PD using historical 
default experience.9 
INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
                                                 
7 Assuming that shareholders are protected by limited liability, there are no costs of default, and that 
absolute priority rules are strictly observed, then the shareholders’ payoff in the default region is zero. 
8 Using put-call parity, Merton (1974) values risky debt as a put option on the firm’s assets giving the 
shareholders the right, not the obligation, to sell the firm’s assets to the bondholders at the value of the debt 
outstanding.  The default region then corresponds to the region in which the shareholders exercise the put 
option.  The model uses equity volatility to estimate asset volatility since both the market value of firm 
assets and asset volatility are unobservable.  See Ronn and Verma (1986). 
9 The Moody’s approach uses a neural network to analyze historical experience and current financial data 
On February 11, 2002, Moody’s announced that it was acquiring KMV for more than $200 million in cash.   
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5.1 KMV’s Portfolio Manager  
Three inputs are needed for each loan to calculate the credit risk of a portfolio 
using KMV’s Portfolio Manager: expected return, risk (variance), and correlation.   
The distance to default (DD) for individual credits is converted into a probability 
of default (PD) by determining the likelihood that the firm’s assets will traverse the debt 
boundary point during the credit horizon period.  KMV uses a historical database of 
default rates to determine an empirical estimate of the PD, denoted Expected Default 
Frequency (EDF).  For example, historical evidence shows that firms with DD equal to 4 
have an average historical default rate of 1%.  Thus, KMV assigns an EDF of 1% to firms 
with DD equal to 4.  If DD>4 (DD<4), then the KMV EDF is less (more) than 1%.  The 
complete mapping of KMV EDF scores to DD is proprietary.  EDFs are calibrated on a 
scale of 0% to 20%.  
Retail clients do not have a series of equity prices that can be used to estimate 
asset values or asset volatility.  Therefore, KMV modifies its Portfolio Manager model to 
obtain a loan’s EDF and uses estimated values when needed.  Specifically, KMV 
calculates the excess return on a loan (Rit) as follows: 
Rit = [Spreadi + Feesi] – [Expected lossi] – rf     (6) 
Or  
Rit = [Spreadi + Feesi] – [EDFi x LGDi] – rf     (7) 
The model uses estimated and proprietary values for the expected default 
frequency and loss given default since retail credit is not publicly traded.  Correlations 
range from 0.002 to 0.15. 
The risk, or unexpected loss, is calculated as follows: 
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σi = [EDFi (1-EDFi)]1/2 x LGDi      (8) 
We report the findings of a study that examines the implementation of credit risk 
models in banks.  The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and the 
Institute of International Finance (IIF) tested credit risk measurement models in 25 
commercial banks from 10 countries.  (See IIF/ISDA (2000).)  The KMV model is 
compared to internal models for standardized portfolios (without option elements) created 
to replicate retail credits.  
The results for retail credit showed a range of credit risk estimates.  Moreover, 
proprietary internal models were used most often by the banks participating in the survey 
for the retail markets portfolio as compared to any other portfolio.  These internal models 
typically focused on default only.  Two test portfolios were constructed.  The small 
portfolio was created to emulate a credit card portfolio.  Credit facilities ranged from $0 
to $5,000 with an average of just over $807.  The small portfolio included almost 350,000 
distinct borrowers.  The large portfolio included facilities ranging in value from $0 to 
$30,000 with an average of just over $12,000 and almost 170,000 distinct borrowers.  
The analysts made several assumptions concerning the base case.  They assumed 
expected losses were 1.1 (0.6) percent for the small (large) portfolio and unexpected 
losses were 0.4 (0.3) percent for the respective portfolios.  They assumed loss given 
default was 90 percent with no volatility.  For the KMV model, they assumed correlations 
of 4 percent.  Since some models include country information in the analysis, one 
country, Canada, was chosen for the base case.  These assumptions were altered in 
sensitivity analysis. 
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INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
As shown in Table 3, there were significant differences in the risk measures 
estimated by the different models for the retail credit portfolio.  At confidence level of 
99.97 percent, KMV generated average value at risk (VAR) estimates of 3.6 (2.3) percent 
for the small (large) portfolio while the corresponding estimates for the internal models 
were 3.2 (2.7) percent.  The KMV results imply that a bank manager can be almost 
certain (that is, 99.97 percent certain) that the bank will not lose more than 3.6 (2.3) 
percent of its small (large) retail portfolio.  
Sensitivity analysis included varying correlations, credit quality (expected and 
unexpected losses), and loss given default.  As expected, increases (decreases) in 
correlation led to considerable higher (lower) values at risk.  However, allowing the 
banks to assume the exposures were in their home countries did not alter VARs much, 
though one bank reported a slight increase when the exposures were assumed to be 
located in its home country.  Decreases in credit quality increased VARs substantially:  
Doubling expected and unexpected loss percentages nearly doubled VARs.  Finally, 
reducing LGD from 90 percent to 25 percent reduced VARs to approximately one third 
of their original values. 
 5.2 Moody’s RiskCalc 
 Moody’s RiskCalc seeks to determine which private firms will default on their 
loans.  (For an overview of RiskCalc, see Falkenstein et al. (2000).)  Using credit scoring, 
the analysis looks at a handful of financial ratios to determine which firms are likely to 
default.  Although designed for middle market firms, the model could be used for any 
firm that is too large to be considered an extension of its owner.  That is, the analysis is 
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performed on the firm’s financial information and not that of the owner.  Lenders can 
currently use RiskCalc to analyze the creditworthiness of firms with $100,000 or more in 
assets. 
 Patterned after its model for public firms, Moody’s determines which financial 
ratios are most important in determining default of private companies by analyzing 
previous defaults.  The firm creates a proprietary Credit Research Database (CRD) and 
then weights the ratios according to their historic importance in default.  Moody’s finds 
substantial differences between ratios that are important for public firms and those that 
are important for private firms.  The current financial ratios of a firm are multiplied by 
the weights to determine one- and five-year expected default frequencies.  The EDFs can 
then be mapped into Moody’s rating categories.  If a particular ratio is missing, RiskCalc 
uses the mean value of all observations.  The more missing data, the less useful the 
model. 
Moody’s has compiled separate Credit Research Databases for individual 
countries around the world.  Databases exist for North American countries (the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico), European countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy, and Austria) as well as Japan, 
Australia, and Singapore.  Since the database for each country is different, each country 
has a separate model.  For example, the U.S. CRD consists of almost 34,000 companies 
and almost 1,400 defaults.  The three most important risk factors in the U.S. model are 
profitability, which has a weight of 23 percent, capital structure with a weight of 21 
percent and liquidity/cash flow with a weight of 19 percent.  The Singaporean CRD (see 
Kocagil et al. (2002)) consists of almost 4,500 Singaporean borrowers with about 650 
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defaults.  Although risk factors are similar to the U.S. model, they are not the same.  The 
weight on profitability is 26 percent, on capital structure is 24 percent, and size is the 
third most important factor, contributing 14 percent to the model.  
Possibilities for applying RiskCalc to retail portfolios exist.  Databases would 
have to be created that examine important ratios specifically for the retail market.  
Creating databases specific to retail borrowers is particularly important in light of the fact 
that Moody’s finds substantial differences between its models for public and private 
firms.  Extending that result suggests substantial differences could exist between middle 
and retail markets.  Applying the current models for the middle market could lead to 
incorrect assessment of credit risk in the retail market.  The creation of such a database 
for the retail market, however, could be difficult.  Retail borrowers by definition often do 
not have reliable financial statements. 
5.3 Credit Risk Plus 
Credit Risk Plus, a proprietary model developed by Credit Suisse Financial Products 
(CSFP), views spread risk as part of market risk rather than credit risk. As a result, in any 
period, only two states of the world are considered - default and non-default - and the 
focus is on measuring expected and unexpected losses.  Thus, Credit Risk Plus is a 
default mode (DM) model.  Furthermore, Credit Risk Plus models default as a continuous 
variable with a probability distribution. Thus, Credit Risk Plus is based on the theoretical 
underpinnings of intensity-based models. An analogy from property fire insurance is 
relevant. When a whole portfolio of homes is insured, there is a small probability that 
each house will burn down, and (in general) the probability that each house will burn 
down can be viewed as an independent event. That is, there is a constant probability that 
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any given house will burn down (or equivalently, a loan will default) within a 
predetermined time period.  Credit Risk Plus has the flexibility to calculate default 
probabilities over a constant time horizon (say, one year) or over a hold-to-maturity 
horizon.  Similarly, many types of loans, such as mortgages and small business loans, can 
be thought of in the same way, with respect to their default risk. Thus, under Credit Risk 
Plus, each individual loan is regarded as having a small probability of default, and each 
loan's probability of default is independent of the default on other loans.  This assumption 
makes the distribution of the default probabilities of a loan portfolio resemble a Poisson 
distribution. 
Moreover, the simplest model of Credit Risk Plus assumes probability of default to be 
constant over time.  A more sophisticated version ties loan default probabilities to the 
systematically varying mean default rate of the “economy” or “sector” of interest.  The 
continuous time extension of Credit Risk Plus is the intensity-based model of Duffie and 
Singleton (1998), which stipulates that over a given small time internal, the probability of 
default is independent across loans and proportional to a fixed default intensity function.   
Default rate uncertainty is only one type of uncertainty modeled in Credit Risk Plus. 
A second type of uncertainty surrounds the size or severity of the losses themselves. 
Borrowing again from the fire insurance analogy, when a house “catches fire,” the degree 
of loss severity can vary from the loss of a roof to the complete destruction of the house. 
In Credit Risk Plus, the fact that severity rates are uncertain is acknowledged, but because 
of the difficulty of measuring severity on an individual loan-by-loan basis, loss severities 
or loan exposures are rounded and banded (for example, into discrete $20,000 severity or 
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loss bands). The smaller the bands are, the less the degree of inaccuracy that is built into 
the model as a result of banding. 
The two degrees of uncertainty - the frequency of defaults and the severity of losses - 
produce a distribution of losses for each exposure band. Summing (or accumulating) 
these losses across exposure bands produces a distribution of losses for the portfolio of 
loans.  The great advantage of the Credit Risk Plus model is its parsimonious data 
requirements. The key data inputs are mean loss rates and loss severities, for various 
bands in the loan portfolio, both of which are potentially amenable to collection, either 
internally or externally.   
The assumption of a default rate with a Poisson distribution implies that the mean 
default rate of a portfolio of loans should equal its variance.  However, this assumption 
does not hold in general, especially for lower quality credits.  For B-rated bonds, Carty 
and Lieberman (1996) found the mean default rate was 7.62 percent and the square root 
of the mean was 2.76 percent, but the observed standard deviation was 5.1 percent, or 
almost twice as large as the square root of the mean.  Thus, the Poisson distribution 
appears to underestimate the actual probability of default. 
What extra degree of uncertainty might explain the higher variance (fatter tails) in 
observed loss distributions? The additional uncertainty modeled by Credit Risk Plus is 
that the mean default rate itself can vary over time (or over the business cycle). For 
example, in economic expansions, the mean default rate will be low; in economic 
contractions, it may rise significantly. The most speculative risk classifications’ default 
probabilities are most sensitive to these shifts in macroeconomic conditions.  (See 
Crouhy et al. (2000).)  In the extended Credit Risk Plus model, there are three types of 
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uncertainty: (1) the uncertainty of the default rate around any given mean default rate, (2) 
the uncertainty about the severity of loss, and (3) the uncertainty about the mean default 
rate itself.  Credit Risk Plus derives a closed form solution for the loss distribution by 
assuming that these types of uncertainty are all independent.  However, the assumption of 
independence may be violated if the volatility in mean default rates reflects the 
correlation of default events through interrelated macroeconomic factors. 
Appropriately modeled, a loss distribution can be generated along with expected 
losses and unexpected losses that exhibit observable fatter tails.  The latter can then be 
used to calculate unexpected losses due to credit risk exposure.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
The trend in retail credit decision making is strongly toward increased reliance on 
statistical, data-based models of credit risk measurement.    Retail lending has gradually 
shifted from relationship lending to transactional (portfolio-based) lending.  The earliest 
shift was seen in the area of credit card loans, then mortgage lending became more 
transactional, and now there is an increased trend toward transactional loans to small 
businesses.  The fact that this transition has come in stages has led to the gradual 
understanding that transactional lending is not necessarily detrimental to the lending 
relationship between a bank and a client.  Moreover, transactional lending could create a 
more equitable and liquid financial system.  For example, transactional lending does not 
allow for the subsidization of established borrowers by new borrowers.   One problem 
with transactional lending is that if all banks use the same model, certain borrowers may 
be rationed out of the market with a higher probability than with relationship lending.  
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Moreover, model risk may cause increased correlations in bank returns, engendering 
cyclical fluctuations in the financial condition of the banking sector, with potentially 
macroeconomic consequences. 
Models such as KMV’s Portfolio Manager and CSFB’s Credit Risk Plus 
potentially provide alternative modeling choices.  Such models focus on the equity price 
of the borrowing firm.  The problem with such models is that retail borrowers often do 
not have publicly traded stock and therefore equity prices may not be available or may be 
unreliable because of liquidity problems.  Furthermore, Credit Risk Plus focuses on the 
middle market and must develop databases that directly assess retail borrowers before the 
model can be used in retail lending.  Models for retail credit exist.  Lenders must 
determine what kind of model they would like and whether to develop it in-house or to 
buy a credit scoring system. 
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Table 1 
Illustrative IRB Risk Weights 
          
Asset Class: Residential Mortgage  Other Retail  Qualifying  Revolving 
LGD:  45% 25%  45% 85%  45% 85% 
Maturity:2.5 years         
PD:          
0.03%  4.31% 2.40%  4.97% 9.38%  4.10% 7.74% 
0.05%  6.51% 3.62%  7.42% 14.02%  6.10% 11.52% 
0.10%  11.25% 6.25%  12.54% 23.68%  10.21% 19.29% 
0.25%  22.70% 12.61%  23.91% 45.16%  19.02% 35.93% 
0.40%  32.19% 17.89%  32.28% 60.98%  25.13% 47.46% 
0.50%  37.89% 21.05%  36.86% 69.63%  28.30% 53.45% 
0.75%  50.68% 28.16%  46.01% 86.90%  34.18% 64.56% 
1.00%  62.03% 34.46%  52.90% 99.93%  38.12% 72.01% 
1.30%  74.31% 41.28%  59.25% 111.91%  41.26% 77.94% 
1.50%  81.88% 45.49%  62.64% 118.33%  42.71% 80.68% 
2.00%  99.19% 55.10%  69.20% 130.71%  44.95% 84.90% 
2.50%  114.70% 63.72%  73.96% 139.71%  46.05% 86.98% 
3.00%  128.86% 71.59%  77.67% 146.71%  46.62% 88.07% 
4.00%  154.13% 85.63%  83.50% 157.72%  47.38% 89.50% 
5.00%  176.35% 97.97%  88.56% 167.29%  48.46% 91.53% 
6.00%  196.27% 109.04%  93.64% 176.87%  50.16% 94.74% 
10.00%  260.66% 144.81%  117.95% 222.79%  61.51% 116.19% 
15.00%  320.10% 177.83%  154.81% 292.41%  77.45% 146.29% 
20.00%  365.62% 203.12%  192.33% 363.29%  90.79% 171.49% 
          
Source: BIS, Quantitative Impact Study 3 Technical Guidance, October 2002, p. 139.  
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Table 2:  International Survey of Credit Scoring Models 
STUDIES CITED EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
United States  
Altman (1968) EBIT/assets; retained earnings/ assets; working capital/assets; 
sales/assets; market value (MV) equity/book value of debt. 
Japan  
Ko (1982) EBIT/sales; working capital/debt; inventory turnover 2 years 
prior/inventory turnover 3 years prior; MV equity/debt; standard 
error of net income (4 years). 
Takahashi et al. 
(1979) 
Net worth/fixed assets; current liabilities/assets; voluntary 
reserves plus unappropriated surplus/assets; interest 
expense/sales; earned surplus; increase in residual value/sales; 
ordinary profit/assets; sales - variable costs. 
Switzerland  
Weibel (1973) Liquidity (near monetary resource asset – current liabilities)/ 
operating expenses prior to depreciation; inventory turnover; 
debt/assets. 
Germany  
Baetge, Huss and 
Niehaus (1988) 
Net worth/(total assets – quick assets – property & plant); 
(operating income + ordinary depreciation + addition to pension 
reserves)/assets; (cash income – expenses)/short term liabilities. 
von Stein and 
Ziegler (1984) 
Capital borrowed/total capital; short-term borrowed 
capital/output; accounts payable for purchases & deliveries / 
material costs; (bill of exchange liabilities + accounts 
payable)/output; (current assets – short-term borrowed 
capital)/output; equity/(total assets – liquid assets – real estate); 
equity/(tangible property – real estate); short-term borrowed 
capital/current assets; (working expenditure – depreciation on 
tangible property)/(liquid assets + accounts receivable – short-
term borrowed capital); operational result/capital; (operational 
result + depreciation)/net turnover; (operational result + 
depreciation)/short-term borrowed capital; (operational result + 
depreciation)/total capital borrowed. 
England  
Marais (1979), 
Earl & Marais 
(1982) 
Current assets/gross total assets; 1/gross total assets; cash 
flow/current liabilities; (funds generated from operations – net 
change in working capital)/debt. 
Canada  
Altman and 
Lavallee (1981) 
Current assets/current liabilities; net after-tax profits/debt; rate of 
growth of equity – rate of asset growth; debt/assets; sales/assets. 
The Netherlands  
Bilderbeek (1979) Retained earnings/assets; accounts payable/sales; added value/ 
assets; sales/assets; net profit/equity. 
van Frederikslust 
(1978) 
Liquidity ratio (change in short term debt over time); 
profitability ratio (rate of return on equity). 
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED) 
STUDIES CITED EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Spain  
Fernandez (1988) Return on investment; cash flow/current liabilities; quick ratio/ 
industry value; before tax earnings/sales; cash flow/sales; 
(permanent funds/net fixed assets)/industry value. 
Italy  
Altman, Marco, 
and Varetto (1994) 
Ability to bear cost of debt; liquidity; ability to bear financial 
debt; profitability; assets/liabilities; profit accumulation; trade 
indebtedness; efficiency. 
Australia  
Izan (1984) EBIT/interest; MV equity/liabilities; EBIT/assets; funded debt/ 
shareholder funds; current assets/current liabilities. 
Greece  
Gloubos and 
Grammatikos 
(1988) 
Gross income/current liabilities; debt/assets; net working 
capital/assets; gross income/assets; current assets/current 
liabilities. 
Brazil  
Altman, Baidya, & 
Ribeiro-Dias,1979 
Retained earnings/assets; EBIT/assets; sales/assets; MV equity/ 
book value of liabilities. 
India  
Bhatia (1988) Cash flow/debt; current ratio; profit after tax/net worth; interest/ 
output; sales/assets; stock of finished goods/sales; working 
capital management ratio.  
Korea  
Altman, Kim and 
Eom (1995) 
Log(assets); log(sales/assets); retained earnings/assets; MV of 
equity/liabilities. 
Singapore  
Ta and Seah 
(1981) 
Operating profit/liabilities; current assets/current liabilities; 
EAIT/paid-up capital; sales/working capital; (current assets – 
stocks – current liabilities)/EBIT; total shareholders’ 
fund/liabilities; ordinary shareholders’ fund/capital used. 
Finland  
Suominen (1988) Profitability: (quick flow – direct taxes)/assets; Liquidity: (quick 
assets/total assets); liabilities/assets. 
Uruguay  
Pascale (1988) Sales/debt; net earnings/assets; long term debt/total debt. 
Turkey  
Unal (1988) EBIT/assets; quick assets/current debt; net working capital/sales; 
quick assets/inventory; debt/assets; long term debt/assets. 
Notes:  Whenever possible, the explanatory variables are listed in order of statistical 
importance (e.g., the size of the coefficient term) from highest to lowest.  Source: Altman 
and Narayanan (1997). 
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Table 3 
Summary of IIF/ISDA Results for the Retail Credit Portfolio 
 
MODEL Exposure  
US$ millions  
Expected Loss  
%      
Unexpected 
Loss % 
Risk at 
99.97% 
Small Portfolio 
KMV Portfolio 
Manager 
722 1.1 0.4 3.6 
Internal Models 722 1.1 0.5 3.2 
Large Portfolio 
KMV Portfolio 
Manager 
2,285 0.6 0.3 2.3 
Internal Models 2,245 0.6 0.3 2.7 
 
Source: IIF/ISDA Study, Chapter I, p. 24.   
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Figure 1 
July 2002 Basel New Capital Accord Proposals 
 Internal Ratings-Based Retail Credit Risk Weights 
 
Source: BIS (July 2002).   
Risk weights are depicted as functions of PD, assuming LGD =45% 
 
 
Figure 1: July 2002 BIS Proposals for Retail Credit Capital Requirements
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